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Abstract
In this paper we assess opinion polls, prediction markets, expert opin-
ion, and statistical modelling over a large number of US elections in order
to determine which perform better in terms of forecasting outcomes. In
line with existing literature, we bias-correct opinion polls. We consider
accuracy, bias and precision over different time horizons before an elec-
tion, and we conclude that prediction markets appear to provide the most
precise forecasts and are similar in terms of bias to opinion polls. We
find that our statistical model struggles to provide competitive forecasts
whilst expert opinion appears to be of value. Finally we note that the fore-
cast horizon matters; while prediction market forecasts tend to improve
the nearer an election is, opinion polls appear to perform worse, while
expert opinion performs consistently throughout. We thus contribute to
the growing literature comparing election forecasts of polls and prediction
markets.
JEL Classification: C53, D83, D72.
Keywords: Forecasting Models, Information and Knowledge, Elections,
Voting Behaviour, Prediction Markets.
1 Introduction
There exist many sources of information one could use to forecast the outcome
of an election ex ante; statistical models, expert opinion, opinion polls, and
prediction markets are just four. Any such forecast is dependent on some set
of information amassed at a particular point in time prior to the event hap-
pening, denoted It, and also on the model through which that information is
processed, ft(It). In this paper we consider each of these potential models:
statistical models, where information generally released by statistical agencies is
processed using statistical methods, expert opinion, where information is pro-
cessed by experts, polls, where information from potential voters is processed
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by polling companies and released, and prediction markets, where agents may
also use potentially private information to buy and sell contracts contingent
on a particular future event, thus revealing information in the process of doing
so. As such, we are providing an additional perspective on the so-called Hayek
hypothesis (Hayek, 1945; Smith, 1982) which suggests that markets can work
efficiently even when participants have a limited knowledge of the environment
or other participants (see also Hurley and McDonough, 1995).
In doing so, we build upon prior literature which identifies different types
of prediction market, classified according to type of contract (Snowberg and
Zitzewitz, 2005), and which have sought to examine the historical accuracy of
election markets (Rhode and Strumpf, 2004) and to compare and/or relate the
behaviour and performance of these markets to that of opinion polls (e.g. Kou
and Sobel, 2004; Leigh and Wolfers, 2006; Berg et al., 2008; Rothschild, 2009).
We make use of a vast, novel dataset from historical US elections to conduct
our forecast comparison exercise. We assess the types of forecast based on the
same criteria: Accuracy, bias, and precision of historical forecasts. By accuracy
we mean how often a forecast correctly predicts the election outcome, by bias
whether the expected vote share or outcome probability is equal to the actual
vote share or true probability, and by precision the variance of forecast errors.
We find that prediction markets appear to provide the most precise forecasts and
are similar in terms of bias to opinion polls. We find that our statistical model
struggles to provide competitive forecasts whilst expert opinion appears to be
of value. Finally we note that the forecast horizon matters; while prediction
market forecasts tend to improve the nearer an election is, opinion polls appear
to perform worse, while expert opinion performs consistently throughout.
In Section 2 we introduce our object of interest, the outcome of an election
before we introduce in Section 3 our candidate forecast models and the datasets
we have for each forecast model. Section 4 then discusses the methodology
we use in assessing these forecast models and Section 5 outlines our results.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Actual Outcome
The outcomes of an election are manifold; more often than not in US elections,
there are two candidates (a Republican and a Democrat), and the vote share
each receives is one outcome of interest, as well as who actually wins each
election.1
We think of the two-party vote share for candidate or party i in election j
as Vi,j,T , where T is the date of the election, and we denote forecasts of that
vote share made by forecaster f at date t, where t < T , as V̂i,j,f,T |t . If we
are considering only the two-party vote share, then the alternative outcome of
interest is whether or not Vi,j,T > 0.5, as in this situation party i has won the
election in terms of vote share, and hence we might think of a binary variable:
Wi,j,T = 1{Vi,j,T=maxk{Vk,j,T }Nk=1}. (1)
1This is particularly so for US Presidential Elections which are determined by the electoral
college system and hence anomalies like the 2000 Bush vs. Gore election can happen where
the winner was Bush even though Gore gained the larger (popular) vote share.
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That is, Wi,j,T is 1 if party i wins election j (in terms of vote share), zero
otherwise. We define Wi,j,T in (1) generally for an N -candidate election, yet
often elections in the US involve just two candidates, and in that situation the
probability that Vi,j,T > 0.5, i.e. the vote share on election day is sufficient to
win the election popular vote, is what matters. The forecast made at time t < T
of whether or not a vote share Vi,j,T will be sufficient to win an election we denote
as Ŵi,j,f,T |t = P̂t
(
Vi,j,T = maxk {Vk,j,T }Nk=1
)
, or Ŵi,j,f,T |t = P̂t (Vi,j,T > 0.5)
in the case of a two-candidate election.
3 The Candidate Forecast Models
We consider a number of sources of pre-election forecasts in this paper:
1. Opinion polls as collated by Real Clear Politics and Polling Report, two
websites that collect historical and current polling information surround-
ing elections.2
2. Price data from Iowa Electronic Markets, an online prediction market for
various political (and other) events.3
3. Price data from Betfair, an online betting company that offers markets
which include political events or else which include election outcomes.4
4. Price data from Intrade, an online betting company that offers predomi-
nantly political markets or perhaps politically related markets.5
5. Expert opinion as canvassed for the PollyVote Project.
6. Regression modelling using the methodology of Fair (1996) in order to
forecast outcomes using macroeconomic variables.
We consider each to be a forecast model; a mechanism that transforms informa-
tion available at time t < T , It into a forecast for either a vote share V̂i,j,f,T |t
or a probability of the election outcome Ŵi,j,f,T |t . In the next four subsections
we describe each of these sources of data and comment on the mechanisms that
generate forecasts from information available at time t.
3.1 Opinion Polls
Opinion polls are conducted by numerous companies in the US surrounding all
sorts of elections and political questions (e.g. presidential approval). In the
case of elections, polls are forecasts of vote shares conducted at some point t < T
by polling company f , hence they are denoted as V̂i,j,f,T |t . Notionally, polls
reflect public opinion regarding voting for particular candidates, and assuming
the sample upon which they are based is representative, they can be seen as
some reflection of voting intentions at time t, something which we denote Vi,j,t.
As such, to treat a poll as a forecast of the eventual election outcome, we assume
2See http://www.realclearpolitics.com/ and http://www.pollingreport.com/ for details.
3See http://tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/.
4See http://www.betfair.com.
5See http://www.intrade.com/.
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thus that such voting intentions do not change in the intervening time period.
Hence there are at least two sources of error: the first is that the vote share
forecast by the poll (V̂i,j,f,T |t ) may not be a true reflection of Vi,j,t; and/or Vi,j,t
may differ substantially from Vi,j,T due, for example, to the learning process
that takes place during an election campaign on the part of voters.
Furthermore, political candidates are keen observers of polls and thus to
some extent there may be endogeneity; candidates may respond to poll out-
comes when t < T , increasing or decreasing effort levels. For example, a
particularly disappointing set of polls may lead to a candidate increasing their
effort in an election, which may thus impact Vi,j,T causing it to differ from Vi,j,t.
Furthermore, the success of campaign fundraising efforts may also be affected
by poll outcomes (and potentially prediction markets also). As some polling
companies are known or suspected to favour one political party or the other,
there is the possibility of strategic behaviour on the part of pollsters in the
timing and nature of their polls.
Nonetheless, considering the data at our disposal, we take polls to be fore-
casts of voting intentions on election day, T , as expressed at time t, and we
analyse the extent to which they are effective forecasts of Vi,j,T . We take our
data from Real Clear Politics (RCP), and Polling Report, websites which com-
pile polling data from thousands of US elections over recent years.6 Table 5
summarizes the elections from which we have collected data from RCP; overall
we have 19,277 observations from 394 different elections ranging from presiden-
tial elections in 2004 and 2008 both at the national and state levels, senate,
governor and house elections and also Republican presidential candidate selec-
tion processes in 2008 and 2012, and the Democratic selection process from
2008.
We collect information on the polling company, the length of time the poll
was conducted over, size and type of audience polled (likely voters or registered
voters), forecast vote share for each candidate, and we also record the final
outcome of each election.7 There are averages of polls that are constructed by
various groups, such as RCP themselves, and also others such as Nate Silver at
the blog FiveThirtyEight . Although averaging can be a useful tool, particularly
if the weights are appropriate (see, e.g., Bates and Granger, 1969; Graefe et al.,
2012), it can only outperform the best individual forecast within the pool of
forecasts being averaged in the presence of systematic bias (for example if one
forecast is known to be positively biased and another negatively biased). As
we correct polls for systematic biases, the need for averaging within polls is
mitigated. There remains a potential role for combining forecasts from our
different sources, nonetheless, and we explore this further in Section ??.
Figure 1 plots poll outcomes for Obama’s vote share during 2008 for the
2008 Presidential election; his final 52.9% vote share is denoted by the solid
black line. The plot should be viewed from right to left, as the horizontal axis
is the number of days remaining until the election takes place. Different polling
6See http://www.realclearpolitics.com/ and http://www.pollingreport.com/ for our two
sources.
7We have data on 446 individual poll producers, however many of the producers of polls
are collaborations, such as Reuters and Zogby or Reuters and Ipsos. It is hard to get a
precise number of the different forecasting companies involved because RCP often lists them
abbreviated, but it appears there are around 200 distinct companies or organizations reflected
in our dataset.
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Figure 1: Plot of poll forecasts for Obama vote share in 2008 Presidential Elec-
tion by day.
companies are represented by different colors and symbols. Gallup is one of
the most frequent pollsters and its polls (blue empty squares) appear to become
more accurate as election day nears. All polls throughout the campaign appear
from Figure 1 to underpredict Obama’s eventual vote share, and even in the
final few days the majority of polls announced suggest a vote share lower than
what eventually results.
Gelman and King (1993) investigate the observed variability in polls despite
the fact that election outcomes are particularly predictable at the outset of
campaigns. They find that voters learn over the campaign which contributes
to some extent to the variability of polls, meaning that early polls are less
reliable relative to those conducted nearer to election date. Additionally their
research suggests that poll forecasts should be dominated at all stages by expert
opinion, statistical and other types of forecast models that embody some subset
of that information. Gelman and King focus on Presidential elections, and the
1988 election in particular, although it is undoubtedly the case that many of
their conclusions generalize. Nonetheless they do note that some of the effects
they emphasize will likely be different for primary elections, and presumably for
Senate, Governor and House races.
3.2 Prediction Markets
Prediction markets are markets in which participants buy and sell contracts in
event (including election) outcomes. For example, if the market was the 2008
Presidential Election, the contracts would be for the Democratic candidate to
win, or the Republican candidate to win. Prediction markets have attracted
a great deal of attention in recent years from academic economists because,
as Berg et al. (2008) note, their primary role is as a forecasting tool rather
than a resource allocation mechanism (although to some extent it can be said
that they are part of the portfolio allocation problem of participants since there
exists some a priori expected rate of return). Nonetheless, provided their design
mechanism is effective, the prices produced will reflect expected probabilities of
outcomes. Furthermore, in general the markets are short-term (the majority of
those we consider in this paper last for considerably less than a year), and once
the outcome is realized, the true value of the contract is known. This property
enables researchers to consider whether or not prediction markets forecast events
5
well.
Berg et al. (2008) note the important differences between polls and pre-
diction markets as forecasting devices. The former, at least in principle, are
representative samples of the population (or deliberately selected sections of
the population), whereas prediction markets are self-selected in that market
participants must actively choose to take part. As a result, prediction market
participants are anything but representative of the general population; as Berg
et al point out, “traders are typically young, white, well educated and have
high family incomes”. Nonetheless, it is clear that this ought to be irrelevant
for the accuracy of prediction market forecasts since the payoff structure means
that market participants must put aside their own particular preferences over
candidates and predict the voting behaviour of the electorate at large if they
are to make non-negative returns.
Prediction Markets (PMs) have been up and running for over 20 years at
this point; with the first market having been established for the 1988 Bush-
Dukakis contest (Rothschild, 2009). Berg et al. (2008), in their meta-analysis
of the performance of PMs in elections in the USA and in other established
democracies, found that, in terms of predicting the final result, “in the majority
of (...) cases the market does about as well as the average poll, sometimes worse
but often better, even if by a small margin” (p. 747); a finding that builds on a
previous papers comparing PMs data to poll data. Erikson and Wlezien (2008)
note that electoral markets have gained intellectual traction both in academic
circles and in the popular press, with Surowiecki’s (2004) The Wisdom of Crowds
popularizing the idea that aggregated predictions of voting outcomes, which
ask individuals to evaluate likely electoral outcomes can be ‘better’ (p. 35)
than polls, which ask voters how they themselves will vote. Indeed, futures
markets have been extended to predict non-electoral political phenomena, most
controversially the likelihood of terrorist attacks (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004).
Dissenting voices have questioned the alleged superiority of election markets
to polls, and some of the most recent published research comparing polls to elec-
toral markets has sought to ‘discount’ (Rothschild, 2009) or ‘de-bias’ (Erikson
and Wlezien, 2008) poll data, in order to account for observed early poll mar-
gin overestimation and anti-incumbency biases in polling data. However, while
Erikson and Wlezien found that de-biased poll data outperform national-level
electoral market data for US Presidential elections between 1988 and 2004, espe-
cially in winner-takes-all predictions, Rothschild found that de-biased market-
based data outperforms de-biased poll data in state-level forecasts in the 2008
US Presidential and Senatorial elections. Additionally, Lee and Moretti (2009)
use a model of Bayesian learning to suggest that information passes from polls to
PMs, while Sjo¨berg (2009) also challenges the notion of the ‘wisdom of crowds’
by looking at a range of different groups of forecasters for Swedish elections. Fi-
nally, similar comparisons of prediction market forecasts to more traditionally
generated forecasts have been carried out in sports betting, looking at prices
posted by bookmakers against prediction markets (Spann and Skiera, 2009;
Croxson and Reade, 2011; Franck et al., 2011, see, for example). As such, the
relative performance of poll versus electoral market data is still open to debate.
In the next three sections we introduce in turn the three prediction mar-
kets (Iowa Electronic Markets, Intrade and Betfair) we will examine for their
performance in predicting election outcomes.
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Figure 2: Vote share (top panel) and winner takes all (bottom panel) markets
for 2008 US Presidential Election on IEM.
3.2.1 Iowa Electronic Markets
Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) are not-for-profit operated prediction markets
generally linked to political elections (but also markets have existed for box
office movies and other one-off events), and have been running since 1988. On
IEM participants are limited in their exposure in any trade to $500. Markets
have been set up for all major elections for over a decade, and in particular we
have collected data on their prediction markets since 2000. Their markets tend
to have two forms, either a winner-takes-all (WTA) or a vote-share (VS) format.
The former corresponds to forecasting the election outcome and hence would
be described as Ŵi,j,f,T |t , while the latter corresponds to providing forecasts of
the form V̂i,j,f,T |t .
We have 45,590 observations covering 38 elections; those elections are Pres-
idential (2000, 2004 and 2008), Congressional (House and Senate and a joint
market, 2000–2010), and a somewhat ad hoc collection of mayoral elections
and primary elections (alongside Democratic and Republican Conventions since
2000). See Table 6 for more details. For each market and contract IEM makes
available on a daily basis the number of trades (units and dollar volume), the
highest and lowest prices traded at, and the average price. An important
distinction between IEM markets for House and Senate elections is that the
contracts bought and sold are for macro outcomes: Either the Democrats or the
Republicans have a majority in the House or Senate as a result of the election.
Similarly, the Republican and Democratic Convention markets allow the trad-
ing in contracts about the eventual outcome rather than individual primaries.
As Table 6 shows, there are a couple of exceptions (e.g. New York Senate),
but generally IEM does not provide markets for individual elections outside
Presidential elections.
Figure 2 presents prices from IEM for the 2008 Presidential election; on the
top panel the VS market prices are plotted (high, low and average), while on
the bottom panel the WTA prices are plotted. These two graphs visualize
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the difference between the vote share type of forecasts that polls constitute,
V̂i,j,f,T |t , and the probability of outcome, Ŵi,j,f,T |t , that prediction markets
usually provide. Viewing from right-to-left, as the election day draws near,
although the vote shares forecast don’t diverge particularly strongly (top panel),
the probability of each outcome does diverge substantially, and in the final days
of the election the probability of a Democratic victory is around 85% and above.
Berg et al. (2008) compare IEM to polls for Presidential elections back to
1988, and find that IEM outperforms the polls in head-to-head comparisons. In
relation to their study, we consider a much broader selection of recent elections
of all types for both polls and IEM (again see Tables 6 and 5), a strategy that
affords us a larger dataset of more recent polls. Berg et al. (2008) note how the
demographic of market participants on IEM has changed over the years since
1988, and hence by considering elections only after 2000 we expect to have data
more representative of the current IEM demographic.
Erikson and Wlezien (2009) on the other hand contends that polls are ac-
tually more informative than prediction markets making use of novel data on
informal prediction markets for presidential elections going back to 1880, and
using multivariate methods. Although we cannot match Erikson and Wlezien
(2009) for sample length, we have substantially broader depth in that we con-
sider here various types of election other than Presidential elections giving us
the sample size we mentioned above. Additionally, we have multiple observa-
tions per election whereas Erikson and Wlezien (2009) only use one observation,
taken immediately prior to each election. Given King and Gelson’s findings re-
garding the accuracy of polls as election date nears, it seems likely that this is
a favourable comparison for polls; we will be able to shed light on this using
our dataset. Erikson and Wlezien (2008) do consider polls with longer time
horizons until the election when considering Presidential elections between 1988
and 2004, and conduct an empirical bias correction for these polls.
3.2.2 Betfair
Betfair is an online betting company providing markets primarily in sports
events but also increasingly in political events such as elections. In the jargon,
participants either back or lay bets on events, equivalent to buying or selling
contracts paying out contingent on that event happening, such as a politician
to win an election. Betfair operates a limit order book, as it matches partici-
pants willing to buy and sell contracts at particular prices. In contrast to IEM,
participants are not restricted in their potential exposure on Betfair to any ar-
bitrarily imposed limit, and Betfair is a for-profit company; it seems likely that
this would influence the self-selection that takes place for potential market par-
ticipants. When applied to our context of election outcomes with two parties,
Betfair yields observations corresponding to Ŵi,j,f,T |t .
As our objective is to consider what publicly available information could be
used to best forecast an election, although our data is very rich, only certain
aspects of it are relevant. Market participants using Betfair can see what
prices are available to buy and sell contracts in an event, and how much money
(liquidity) is available at each price (buy or sell).
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the implied probabilities (reciprocal of the
market prices for contracts) for each party to win the 2008 Presidential election
over the 900 days prior to the election. In Figure 3 the maximum and minimum
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Figure 3: Plot of implied probability of each party winning 2008 Presidential
Election from Betfair.
prices for a given day, as well as the average price, are plotted, but as these are
very similar to each other it is almost impossible to distinguish them in the plot.
This plot can be compared to the bottom plot in Figure 2 which shows the same
price evolution for IEM. As with IEM, the Democrats are always the favourites
throughout the 900 days shown, and by a slightly larger margin consistently
than IEM, with a similar pattern of divergence in probabilities in the final 50
days of the campaign. These plots suggest that, as with polls highlighted by
Gelman and King, also with prediction markets learning takes place and the
nearer an election is, the more decided becomes the market on the most likely
outcome.
3.2.3 Intrade
Intrade was a prediction market specializing in US political elections.8 There
are no limits on the amount that individuals can trade, as opposed to IEM, and
the format is essentially identical: market participants trade contracts whose
payout is contingent on some event occurring.9 As such, when thinking specif-
ically about election outcomes with two parties, our Intrade data provides us
with observations corresponding to Ŵi,j,f,T |t .
We have data from the 2004 and 2008 US Presidential Election; for both
years we have all individual state voting and for 2008 we have a range of addi-
tional politically related markets.
For the 2004 elections, we have daily data consisting of the high, low and
closing prices, while in 2008 we have data on individual trades carried out on
the exchange. The 2008 data provides information on whether contracts were
bought or sold, the price at which the trade took place and the quantity, along-
side a timestamp of when the trade took place. We have 29,196 observations
from the 2004 Presidential election (although all of these relate to individual
state markets rather than the overall outcome), and 411,858 from the 2008 elec-
8Indeed, the perception has long been that Intrade provides for US elections while Betfair
does so for UK elections; see, for example, http://www.midasoracle.org/2007/04/24/betfair-
vs-tradesports-intrade/ (last accessed April 17 2012).
9Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) compare Intrade to News Futures, a prediction market
based on ‘play money’, using a ‘game’ format, to ascertain whether “money matters”. They
find that money doesn’t appear to improve the forecast performance of prediction markets.
Our analysis, comparing Intrade and Betfair to IEM will shed some light on this question
since IEM restricts the amount of money participants are able to bet.
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Figure 4: Plot of implied probability of each party winning 2008 Presidential
Election from Intrade.
tions (although not all of these relate specifically to elections — see Table 8 for
a breakdown).
The purpose of this study is to find the best forecast method, and since
Intrade reports on its website very visibly the price of the last agreed trade,
clearly more information exists for 2008 for us to assess the Intrade predictions,
but nonetheless the information from 2004 does provide additional information.
Figure 4 shows the Intrade implied probabilities (prices divided by 100) for
the same 900 days prior to the 2008 Presidential election as in Figures 2 and
3. As is perhaps clear, the two parties appear a little closer as measured by
Intrade; at two years prior to the election, the two are absolutely even, and
even with just 50 days to go before the election, the two implied probabilities
overlap for a short period. It is quite likely that this overlap with just 50 days
remaining was due to market manipulation; one trader apparently traded so
as to raise the price on Intrade for the Republican candidate, John McCain.10
As discussed by Hanson and Oprea (2009), we do not see this as necessarily
a problem for our analysis; a manipulator in a liquid market might be viewed
as offering other traders a kind of free lunch in correcting that manipulator’s
attempts to distort.
As with both previous prediction markets, Intrade has also attracted aca-
demic interest; Gil and Levitt (2007) investigated market efficiency looking at
the 2002 FIFA World Cup, while Hartzmark and Solomon (2012) considered the
disposition effect using NFL markets. Snowberg et al. (2007) use TradeSports,
incorporated by Intrade in 2008, to infer implications from elections onto the
macroeconomy by using the 2004 US Presidential election when unreliable exit
polls caused substantial price variation within a single day.
We can now compare all three markets on one plot, in Figure 5, and over
a long period of time the co-movement between these series is very clear. A
comparison between these three prediction markets is of great interest, not least
because the self-selection that takes place in each market will likely be different;
Betfair does not allow those based in the US to trade in their markets, while
IEM does operate in the US but restricts its participants in their exposure,
while Intrade allows those based in the US to trade in its markets but does not
restrict the exposure of participants. Hence it is of interest to compare these
10See http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2008/10/manipulation-of.html
for more information on this.
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Figure 5: Plot of comparable prices from all three prediction markets from the
2008 Presidential Election.
three markets in their ability to forecast elections; do these differences matter?
Furthermore can any of them, as Berg et al. (2008) assert, improve upon polls?
3.3 Statistical Models
Statistical models have been employed on a number of occasions to predict US
election outcomes; Fair (1996), for example, provides a readily updated dataset
from which to predict outcomes outcomes of presidential and congressional elec-
tions. His model relies on a small number of predictors based on economic (real
growth and inflation), past political (results, incumbent identity, terms served)
and geopolitical outcomes (wars), and is estimated using ordinary least squares.
We create real-time forecasts and compare them to our other forecast models.
This step is important because macroeconomic data is subject to often sizeable
revisions, meaning that the data that would have been used to construct elec-
tion forecasts in previous years may have been subsequently revised. Making
use of the archival economic data resource Alfred from the Federal Reserve of
St Louis (http://alfred.stlouisfed.org/), we construct datasets for each election
since 1996 as would have been available at the time. This is clearly important
for any comparison between forecasts different methods as our opinion polls and
prediction market data are all based on real-time information.
In Figure 6 we present the forecasts that our real-time replication of Ray
Fair’s statistical model generate for elections since 1996 at both the presidential
and congressional level. The forecast variable is the two-party vote share for the
Republican party. When we compare forecasts from our statistical model to
the other forecast models, rather than running ordinary least squares estimation
on vote share outcomes, we run a linear probability model on a binary outcome
variable which is 1 if the Republican candidate wins in an election, 0 otherwise.
This way our forecast is a probabilistic one rather than a vote share forecast.
3.4 Expert Opinion
A large amount of information regarding any particular election is difficult to
quantify; into such a vacuum, expert opinion can play an important role. By
expert opinion we refer to forecasts expressed by interested commentators de-
creed to be experts. Cast in terms of the traditional forecasting literature we
11
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might refer to these kinds of forecasts as judgemental forecasts (for a review,
see Lawrence et al., 2006).
We consider a dataset of expert forecasts collected by Graefe et al. (2012),
freely available via the PollyVote project.11 This dataset covers the 2004, 2008
and 2012 presidential elections, and is composed of up to sixteen anonymised
forecasters who are allowed to make regular updates to their forecasts.
Figure 7 shows expert forecasts for the 2008 presidential election, and specif-
ically for the Republican two-party vote share. Each symbol represents a dif-
ferent individual forecast at a different time horizon in advance of the election,
and the dotted line is the actual outcome. In grey we also plot the average
of these expert forecasts; at least graphically it appears better than many of
the individual forecasts; Graefe et al. (2012) argue that the average represents
a better forecast than any individual expert chosen at random.
As with opinion polls and our statistical model, the expert forecasts are in
terms of vote shares and hence need converting to probabilities of outcomes. We
use a simpler variant of the method employed for opinion polling, using only
the forecast and number of days as explanatory variables in a linear probability
model.
4 Methodology
We seek metrics to assess each candidate forecast model. Such metrics should
be impartial between the different forecast models and hence give us an objec-
tive outcome regarding the best forecast model. An immediate obstacle in this
11See http://pollyvote.ifkw.uni-muenchen.de/en/publications/
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Figure 7: Plot of forecasts from sixteen experts for the Republican vote share
at the 2008 Presidential Election.
pursuit is that we have two types of forecasts: vote shares, V̂i,j,f,T |t , and proba-
bilistic forecasts, Ŵi,j,f,T |t . With the former the outcome is continuous over the
unit interval, whereas for the latter the outcome is a binary variable. Various
methods exist to turn opinion poll vote shares into outcome probabilities; Page
(2008) develops a theoretical parametric approach, while alternatives include
non-parametric density estimation using historical poll outcomes. In recent
elections, Nate Silver has been converting polling information into probabilistic
forecasts, although as would be expected with a commercial endeavour, details
regarding the methods employed are undisclosed.12
We employ a regression method to create probabilities; regression methods as
simple as ordinary least squares (OLS) allow the estimation of the probability
associated with observing binary outcomes such as election outcomes (Oij).
Alternatively we could use a probit or a logit model to transform our polling
shares. This is the method employed by Vaughan Williams and Reade (2014)
to transform opinion polls into outcome probabilities.
A probit regression model using Oij as dependent variable estimates, using
historical data, the probability of election victory conditional on a number of
explanatory factors, which we denote by the vector Xij . We write the model
as:
P
(
Vij = max
k
Vik
∣∣∣∣Xij) = Φ (βXij) , (2)
where β is a vector of coefficients, and Φ is the cumulative density function of
the standard normal distribution. In Xij we include information from each
12See, for example, http://goo.gl/gv7xQ1, last accessed 16 October 2014.
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poll for candidate j in election i. We include candidate j’s polled vote share in
election i, but we also include the opinion poll vote shares of other candidates
in the election, as well as information the poll, such as the sample size used. It
seems sensible to explore whether such additional dimensions of polls provide
systematic information on the likelihood of victory of a candidate polled in
addition to the polled vote share; not least doing so enables us to correct for
any known biases in opinion polling relative to known outcomes. Such bias
correction is in line with the method proposed by Erikson and Wlezien (2008)
of correcting poll outcomes before comparing with prediction markets.
Using the estimated coefficients from (2) we then construct predicted proba-
bilities for election outcomes given opinion poll shares; this is a forecast exercise,
forecasting the likelihood of a candidate winning given information in one par-
ticular opinion poll, ̂P (Vij = maxk Vik |Xij ). We estimate the model only using
data up to the most recent day of polling, and then forecast the probability for
forthcoming polls. We do this so that the transformation from polling share to
probability only relies upon information known at the time of the poll.13
As with other attempts to compare forecast methods such as Erikson and
Wlezien (2009), if we rely on direct comparison forecast by each forecaster for
particular events, we will be severely restricted in our number of elections and
hence observations relative to the total datasets we have at our disposal. Instead
we assess each forecasting method over all the elections we are able to collect
data on for that method (see Tables 5–8). Thus we attempt to establish for each
forecaster, independent of the others, how well it forecasts election outcomes,
before comparing these performances between forecasters. There is considerable
overlap between our datasets for each forecaster such that we are considering
forecast performance over very similar datasets.14
Any forecast assessment is reliant on the loss function assumed; what loss do
we suffer if the forecast is wrong in a particular direction? With elections and
vote shares, such a loss function is unlikely to be symmetric since if a forecast is
for 51%, then if the outcome is ±2%, the direction is fundamental — up and the
election outcome (in terms of vote share) is unaltered, down and the outcome
changes.
Our objective is to pick the winner in a forthcoming election, and hence a
very simple metric for forecasts is accuracy: how often does the forecast outcome
occur? Hence whether the forecast is for a vote share of 51% or 65% is somewhat
irrelevant provided that that event happens. However, it is likely that election
outcomes that are nearer to 50% (for a two-party election) will induce lower
success rates. Bearing this in mind, and given that often US Presidential
elections are very close, we also move to consider forecasts more generally. In
this sense, it must be the case that a good forecast is both unbiased, displaying
no systematic biases, and precise, and we will outline how we test for this in
Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
13We make use of an additional dataset of opinion polls for the US presidential elections in
2000 and 2004 to estimate our baseline conversion model.
14While two or three of our models will have overlapping observations for many elections, the
elections for which we have comparable data for all four models is restricted to essentially the
2008 Presidential election (for example, for Intrade we have only state-level 2004 Presidential
election data but for Betfair and IEM we have only national level market data).
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4.1 Accuracy and Unbiasedness
A very simple measure of accuracy is the percentage of correct forecasts. This
is the most direct measure of what minimises our loss function probabilistically;
the forecast method that forecasts correctly most often must on average yield
the lowest loss. In the case of markets that provide Ŵi,j,f,T |t forecasts, we
take a forecast to be predicting a particular outcome if that particular forecast
probability is the highest of the candidates in an election. Hence we take,
for i = 1, . . . , N contestants in an election Ŵ ∗i,j,f,T |t = maxk P̂t (Vk,j,T > 0.5),
the candidate or party with the highest forecast probability of winning, as the
forecast outcome at that point. For forecasts of the nature V̂i,j,f,T |t , we take
V̂ ∗i,j,f,T |t = maxk V̂k,j,T |t , the maximum vote share, as the favourite and hence
predicted outcome. We also denote V ∗i,j,T |t = maxk Vk,j,T |t as the candidate
with the highest vote share and hence the winner of the popular vote in an
election.15
We thus calculate, for forecast model f , the percentage of correct forecasts
as:
%f =
∑Ni
i=1
∑Nj
j=1
∑Nt
t=1 1
{
V ∗i,j,T=V̂
∗
i,j,f,T |t
}
NiNjNt
, (3)
where Nj is the number of elections considered, Ni the number of candidates
and Nt the number of time periods. We compare forecasts along this dimension
to assess the accuracy of polls.16
A related but distinctly different concept to accuracy is that of unbiasedness.
An unbiased forecast can be defined separately for each kind of forecast:
• An unbiased vote share forecast is, on average, equal to the true vote share
outcome: E
(
V̂i,j,f,T |t
)
= Vi,j,T .
• An unbiased probability forecast is, on average, equal to the true proba-
bility that that candidate wins the election: E
(
Ŵi,j,f,T |t
)
= Wi,j,T .
Hence forecasts that are accurate can also be biased, provided the bias is in
the correct direction; if polls are consistently upward biased for candidates that
eventually win, then despite being biased they will be very accurate in predicting
the outcome, whereas polls that are consistently downward biased for candidates
that eventually win will be very inaccurate as well as biased.
When we consider vote share forecasts for candidate i in election j, V̂i,j,f,T |t ,
after an election has happened we observe the true Vi,j,T and hence we can
evaluate the forecast error :
êVi,j,f,T |t = Vi,j,T − V̂i,j,f,T |t . (4)
We can use this forecast error to consider the possibility of biased forecasts. In
taking the simple average of (4) we thus learn whether or not a forecast method
15Which, as noted earlier, need not correspond to the actual winner of the election.
16We could be more demanding with our measure of accuracy in (3) and require that forecast
models got the final ranking of candidates correct; all we require is that the forecast model
correctly identifies the favourite. Given that the majority of US elections are two-party, this
distinction is unlikely to be of much practical relevance.
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is unbiased or not. Hence we calculate:
MFEt =
Nf,t∑
i=0
eˆVi,j,f,T |t , (5)
where Nf,t denotes the number of forecasts we have for each forecast method
at each time period t.
Although we could substitute W for V in (4) and (5) when we observe
forecasts that are probabilities of outcomes, it is likely that because the outcome
is binary that a summation such as in (5) would unfairly penalize probabilistic
forecasts that are above 50% but not by particularly much. As a result, we
convert vote share forecasts into probabilistic forecasts.
In addition, we use a Mincer-Zarnowitz test, or a calibration test, to further
evaluate unbiasedness. That is, we regress the outcome on the probability as
produced by the forecast method:17
Wi,j,T = αW + βW Ŵi,j,f,T |t + εWi,j,t. (6)
The assumption we place on εi,j,T determines the kind of regression model
we employ; although it can be shown that estimating (6) via OLS induces
heteroskedasticity, it is most convenient for our analysis to estimate using OLS
since that implies an iid (independent and identical distribution) assumption
for εWi,j,t of ε
W
i,j,t ∼ (0, σ2W ); we will later make use of this.
In (6), if αV = 0 and βV = 1 the forecast method is said to be unbiased since
then E
(
Ŵi,j,f,T |t
)
= Wi,j,T (because E
(
εWi,j,t
)
= 0). Hence the F-test of the
null hypothesis αV = 0 and βV = 1 is our test of unbiasedness. If the constant
term αV 6= 0 then the forecast method does exhibit some systematic bias, while
if βV 6= 1 then if the true probability of an event changes, the forecast method
either over- or under-adjusts. This phenomenon is commonly referred to in
the betting literature as the favourite longshot bias (FLB). The conventional
FLB (βW > 1) is where bettors relatively over-bet event outcomes with lower
implied probabilities of winning (inferred from the odds) and relatively (though
not necessarily absolutely) under-bet event outcomes with higher implied prob-
abilities of winning. The reverse FLB (βW < 1) occurs where bettors relatively
over-bet and under-bet the converse.
We seek a method to assess forecasts that is unitless due to the two different
types of forecast in our dataset, and hence we employ the same method outlined
in (6) when considering forecasts from polls. Just as αV = 0 and βV = 1 implies
E
(
Ŵi,j,f,T |t
)
= Wi,j,T , and hence that the fitted line through the scatter plot
of forecasts against outcomes corresponds to the 45 degree line, we can apply
the same methodology to polls; does a polled vote share of, say, 47% imply that
on average the resulting outcome is 47%? Hence we run the regression of:
Vi,j,T = αV + βV V̂i,j,f,T |t + εVi,j,t. (7)
Equivalently to above, αV = 0 and βV = 1 imply that on average polled levels
equal actual outcomes and hence the forecast model is unbiased: E
(
V̂i,j,f,T |t
)
=
17Note we write Wi,j,T here, adding a t to the outcome; the observed outcome does not
change through time, we just add this in order that we can run regressions for different
forecasts at different time ts before the election occurs.
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Vi,j,T . The value of this method in comparing our two types of forecast is
that for probabilistic forecasts (Ŵi,j,f,T |t ) we compare to the expected value of,
E (Wi,j,T ) rather than the binary variable itself, Wi,j,T . This reduces a potential
distortion when comparing forecast errors from vote shares and probablistic
forecasts.
Additionally, if αV = 0 and βV = 1 are imposed then ê
V
i,j,f,T |t = ε̂
V
i,j,f,T |t ,
our regression model (7) becomes equivalent to the forecast error from (4) earlier
for vote shares, and hence we can think about (7) as a generalized forecast error.
By running the regression in (7) we learn about the actual relationship between
E
(
V̂i,j,f,T |t
)
and Vi,j,T rather than asserting that the two are equal. Similarly
as with (6), if βV > 1 we have FLB: the favourite on average gets a higher vote
share than the outsider.
Thus in both regression models, (6) and (7), the null hypothesis of αg = 0
and βg = 1, g ∈ {V, Y }, implies that the forecast method is unbiased — on aver-
age it forecasts without error. Although a visual examination of the estimated
α and β coefficients will be informative, it is also useful to construct a direct
test of unbiasedness, and hence we use an F test of the hypothesis that αg = 0
and βg = 1 to evaluate the unbiasedness of our forecast methods. Because in
both types of forecast the F-test measures departures from unbiasedness (ex-
pected values), it should not be influenced by the distinction between Vi,j,T
being continuous on the unit interval and Wi,j,T being binary.
4.2 Precision
Having considered unbiasedness, it is now helpful to move on to thinking about
precision — how precise are the forecasts we get? A conventional measure of the
precision of a forecast is the mean squared forecast error (MSFE) — squaring
the forecast errors we calculated in (4) and summing:
MSFEg =
Nf,t∑
i=0
(
εˆgT |t
)2
, g ∈ {V, Y } , (8)
This is an approximation to the variance of the forecast, centred around the out-
come, and hence is equivalent to the estimated standard error for our regression
model, (7), denoted σ̂2f since the formula for that is:
σ̂2g =
1
Ng,t
Ng,t∑
i=1
(ε̂gi,j,t)
2 =
1
Nf,t
Ng,t∑
i=1
(
Vi,j,T − α̂g − β̂gV̂i,j,f,T |t
)2
=
Ng∑
i=0
(
eˆgT |t
)2
= MSFEg, g ∈ {V, Y } ,
(9)
provided α̂Y = 0 and β̂Y = 1. Thus σ̂
2
g is a more general measure of forecast
accuracy than MSFE which imposes restrictions on (7).
In essence, σ̂2W measures how imprecise a prediction market is at providing
probabilistic forecasts, while σ̂2V measures how imprecise at providing vote-share
forecasts a poll is. However, these two σ̂2 measures consider the precision
around the actual relationship between forecasts and outcomes, rather than
the 45-degree line (which αg = 0 and βg = 1 would imply). The equivalent
MSFE measures impose the αg = 0 and βg = 1 restrictions without testing
17
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Figure 8: Percentage of polls that correctly predict election outcome by weeks
until election.
their appropriateness but nonetheless do provide important information — how
dispersed around the 45-degree line are the forecasts.
Hence we assess forecast errors and the F test of α = 0 and β = 1 to assess
forecast unbiasedness and analyze MSFEs and σ̂2 assess forecast precision.
5 Results
We now consider the accuracy, bias and precision of each of our forecasting
models. We first consider accuracy via the percentage of correct forecasts (3),
presenting the results graphically for each market then assessing the markets
head-to-head, before considering via regression methods the accuracy and pre-
cision of the markets.
5.1 Accuracy
Figure 8 reports the overall percentage of opinion polls that correctly forecast
the actual outcome by weeks before the election was due to take place, and the
bars represent the number of polls that fall into each category.18 We then refine
by particular types of election.
The overall percentage of forecasts which are correct drawn from polls is
71.0%, increasing to 76.8% if only the Presidential elections of 2004 and 2008
are considered. In Figure 8 we chart the performance of polls as the distance
to election, and hence the forecast horizon, increases. There appears to be
no particular improvement in poll performance as an election nears, something
which contrasts with Gelman and King’s findings. Even for presidential elec-
tions, for which performance does appear to peak in the 4–5 weeks before an
election, performance is actually comparable if not better between weeks 19 and
23 where just under 100 polls record a success percentage of slightly over 90%.
The black diamonds in Figure 8 show the overall performance of polls for all
elections we consider, and this does improve slightly from a low of just above
60% with 13 weeks remaining to around 80% with two weeks remaining, but this
18Where we point out that the ‘winner’ in terms of vote share is taken to be the candidate
that won the most votes, hence for example in the 2000 Presidential election, Gore is classed
as the winner as he won more of the popular vote.
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weeks until election.
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Figure 10: Percentage of Betfair prices that correctly predict election outcome
by weeks until election.
performance is not significantly better than polling performances 30–40 weeks
before an election.19
Turning to IEM, we split forecasts into vote share (VS) and winner-takes-all
(WTA) markets. The percentage of forecasts that were correct is 83.5% (VS)
and 79.8% (WTA), changing to 85.2% and 72.3% respectively for presidential
elections. Figure 9 presents a graphical breakdown of how these percentages
move as the time until election increases with WTA on the left panel, VS on
the right. What is perhaps most notable here is that IEM’s WTA Presidential
elections forecasts seem significantly worse than all of its other election forecasts
in the final 20 weeks before the election takes place — before that, its success
ratio is considerably higher the IEM average. Intriguingly, the VS markets show
Presidential election forecasts better than average, although there is little other
than Presidential markets in this category of market (85% of our observations
are from the 2000, 2004 and 2008 Presidential elections), but in absolute terms
the percentage is higher, remaining just shy of 85% up to the final week of the
election, as opposed to the WTA percentage of between 55% and 65%.
With Betfair, we display the percentage of correct forecasts in Figure 10
weekly for a year in advance of each election. Betfair’s overall percentage of
correct forecasts is 85.5% and 99.8% for the 2008 Presidential election (falling
to 95.3% for the Next President market), while we present the breakdown by
19In Figure 13 we plot standard error bands helping to make such a comparison.
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Figure 11: Percentage of Intrade prices that correctly predict election outcome
by weeks until election.
weeks before an election occurs in Figure 10. Aside from this almost perfect
record in forecasting the 2008 election, additionally for both Republican and
Democratic primaries, Betfair has a success percentage of 87.1% in the final 30
weeks of campaigns. Betfair forecasts of statewide elections for the electoral
collage (upside down triangles) improve from essentially zero 20 weeks before
election day to 90% in the final week.
Figure 11 shows Intrade percentages in the same format as for the previous
three candidate forecast models. Intrade has a percentage of forecasts turning
out correct of 84.0%, rising to 88.1% for the 2008 Presidential election. As
with Betfair, we see a high level of correct forecasts, particularly for the 2008
Presidential election where again up to around week 38, Intrade prices imply a
correct forecast almost every trade. From Table 8 we have a large collection
of markets from Intrade related to US Presidential elections in 2008 other than
simply the outcome or vote share, and the purple dots in Figure 11 represent
these; as can be seen, the prediction record on these more eclectic events (e.g.
whether a particular video will be released by the LA Times by a particular
date) is dramatically worse than for US elections, as even in the week before
the election takes place the percentage of forecasts that are correct is only
around 50%. However as these minor markets make up a small fraction of our
total observations, their impact on the overall percentage is minimal; it is lower
percentages for statewide Presidential elections, Governor markets and other
Presidential-related markets that pulls the overall percentage down.
Considering expert opinion, we take a forecast probability of victory of above
50% as indicating the event an expert is predicting to happen. We find that
93% of the time experts correctly predicted the outcome of a Presidential elec-
tion. Spread over the weeks before an election, this varies little; Figure 12 shows
that it is actually at longer horizons that experts perform best; between 21 and
38 weeks before an election, experts predict perfectly the outcome of elections.
It is not clear that this is consistent with an enlightened voter theory regard-
ing election outcomes since the experts become less accurate in forecasting the
nearer an election is; to be consistent with the theory, experts should continue
to be as accurate as the election nears while voters become more learned.
Finally considering our statistical model approach, we only have 14 forecasts,
and of those 8 are correct (in that both the forecast and outcome are above
(below) 50), giving an accuracy rate of 57%.
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Figure 12: Percentage of expert predictions that correctly predict election out-
come by weeks until election.
It is informative to compare our poll and prediction market candidate fore-
casts with each other directly on a plot, and Figure 13 does that, plotting the
four as different series over the year up to elections. We additionally include 95%
significance-level standard error bounds around each market’s plot, enabling us
to assess whether differences are significant.20 The plot indicates that the best
forecasting method to choose based on accuracy (percentage of forecasts turning
out correct) is Betfair from 30 weeks before an election up to election week. It
is at this kind of range that the expert forecasts (plotted separately) are also es-
sentially always correct. In the three weeks immediately before an election the
performance of the four methods becomes much less dispersed, but nonetheless
Betfair remains significantly better than polls and Intrade, although not signifi-
cantly better than IEM WTA. With the exception of three weeks (8, 30 and 40
weeks prior), polls are dominated by prediction markets in providing accurate
forecasts in the 40 weeks before an election occurs. In the final 10 weeks be-
fore an election, the performance of the IEM (both VS and WTA) and Intrade
markets is indistinguishable statistically, and with the exception of forecasts 2
and 3 weeks before an election, significantly superior to polls.
Thus, concluding our discussion of accuracy in terms of the percentage of
correct forecasts, we find that prediction markets and expert opinion dominate
polls in providing accurate forecasts.
20The distinctly differently sized confidence bands is more a function of sample size rather
than any inherent uncertainty in particular models. This is because we only have one obser-
vation per day per market for IEM, only a relatively small number of polls per market per
week, whereas we have often hundreds and even thousands of trades per day on Intrade and
Betfair. We do not reduce our Intrade or Betfair samples down to any kind of daily average
in order not to discard any important data.
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Figure 13: Plot comparing the percentage of correct forecasts for poll and pre-
diction market forecasts of forecast information for US elections.
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Figure 14: Plot comparing average forecast errors, as calculated in (5), head-
to-head between opinion polls and prediction markets, by weeks until election.
Left panel is all weeks in the year prior to an election, right panel focuses on
final five weeks pre-election.
5.2 Bias and Precision
We next consider bias, whether the expected value of a forecast equals the true
value, and precision, how much variance a forecast model exhibits, graphically
before conducting a basic regression analysis help quantify our findings.
Figure 14 plots the average errors with standard error bounds for opinion
polls and prediction markets hence giving an idea about the bias of forecasts.
It is worth noting that the standard error bounds contain information on the
precision of each forecast since the standard error of the forecast error is equal
to the squared root of the MSFE (from (9)) with the restriction αg = βg−1 = 0
imposed. The left plot shows the entire year before an election, while the right
plot zooms in on the final five weeks.
From the left panel, over short intervals all forecast models display biases
in one direction or another, but over the longer term these biases do appear to
cancel each other out. The polls and IEM (both) deliver what appears to be
the most consistent performance, with Betfair and Intrade fluctuating markedly
around zero. In general polls have a slight upward bias, while IEM has a
slight downward bias, moreso in VS than WTA, Betfair upward and Intrade
downward. It thus appears that prediction markets provide higher forecast
success yet are not necessarily less biased than polls.
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Figure 15: Plot of average forecast errors, as calculated in (5), for expert opinion.
We plot expert opinion in Figure 15, for comparison with opinion polls and
prediction markets. Apart from around 10 weeks before an election, expert opin-
ion appears competitive with polls and prediction markets, with errors fluctu-
ating around zero but never more than about ±0.05. Similar to Betfair, expert
opinion appears to be much worse further than 40 weeks before the election.
Considering finally our statistical model, the average forecast error across all
forecasts is 0.055, which is competitive with our other forecasts. The statistical
forecasts are all conducted in real-time terms one week before the election, as
this is when the most recent data release was to that particular election.
Considering the regression model approach outlined in Section 4, Table 1
contains the output from the regression models for all of our models over all
available observations.
The regression in columns (1) is of our opinion polls transformed into out-
come probabilities, while column (2) differs slightly in that it is a regression
of vote share forecasts (Vi,j,T ) from IEM on vote share forecasts (V̂i,j,f,T |t ),
while the remaining columns contain regressions of actual outcomes of elections
(Wi,j,T ) on implied probabilities (Ŵi,j,f,T |t ) from prediction markets, expert
opinion and our statistical model. The principle is the same in all regressions;
unbiased forecasts should be reflected in finding that αg = 0 and βg = 1, namely
that the implied regression line is on the 45 degree line and hence a poll fore-
casting a vote share on average is correct (columns (1) and (2)), and a contract
priced implying a particular probability pays out with that frequency (columns
(3)–(5)).
The first row of numbers in each column contains the estimates for αg, the
intercept coefficient, while the second row contains the estimates for βg, the
slope coefficient. Beneath these coefficients is the output of an F-test of αg = 0
and βg = 1; the first line is the p-value, the probability of a incorrect rejection of
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Polls IEM (V) IEM Intrade Betfair Expert Stat.
α̂g -0.003
∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ 0.133
(-0.557) (62.113) (31.031) (-28.363) (-47.351) (-15.040) (0.363)
β̂g 0.999
∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 1.044∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗ 1.179∗∗∗ 0.849
(77.082) (56.241) (105.674) (516.245) (460.119) (133.37) (1.284)
p val 0.427 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.896
F stat 0.8507 1943.101 482.209 409.130 2849.682 225.5 0.111
σ̂2g 0.432 0.042 0.139 0.102 0.113 0.247 0.501
T 21803 11429 31737 356620 183775 9086 14
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1: Regressions for bias and precision for all forecast models over all ob-
servations.
the null hypothesis, and the second row is the F-test statistic itself. In essence,
the larger is the F-test statistic, the further away from α = 0 and β = 1 is that
particular set of forecasts. Because of the huge sample sizes of our regressions
(from the final row), it is expected that p-values will be very small, with the
exception of the final column for our statistical model.21 The largest F-test
statistics by some distance are for IEM vote share in the second column, and
Betfair in the fifth column. For IEM this is mainly driven by a departure from
unity of the β̂g coefficient, at 0.622, and the constant coefficient at 0.135, while
for Betfair it would appear more a function of sample size since the deviation
from αg = βg − 1 = 0 is smaller yet the sample size is almost ten times as large
as for polls. In terms of actual coefficient sizes, the smallest departure from
αg = βg − 1 = 0 is for opinion polls and Intrade. Opinion polls in particular
do not reject the null hypothesis of αg = βg − 1 = 0; that said, the opinion
polls in this regression have been bias corrected as part of the transformation to
probabilistic forecasts. However, this bias correction was done on a real-time
basis such that the appropriate transformation could have been made at the
time and used as a forecast; to this extent we feel the comparison is a fair one.22
In terms of precision, the vote share regression of IEM has a much smaller
σ̂g than the winner-takes-all regressions; within the winner takes all Betfair
and Intrade are more precise than IEM, with Intrade appearing most precise.
Expert opinion appears less precise than prediction markets, but transformed
polls are even less precise than experts; the statistical model provides the least
precise forecasts.23
Finally we note that IEM (both VS and WTA) and the statistical model
display evidence of a reverse favourite-longshot bias (FLB), whereas Betfair,
21(Campos et al., 2003) discuss this problem with inference in large samples, and suggest
adjusting significance level to T−0.8, where T is sample size.
22In a previous version of the paper we considered this regression with simple polling vote
shares, and found some evidence of the kinds of biases that a strategy such as ours was able to
correct for. It is worth noting also that similarly one could consider bias correcting prediction
market prices.
23Again, in a previous version of the paper the regression here for poll shares provided a
very low σ̂g , suggesting that the size of this parameter is a function of the kind of forecast
being made.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Polls IEM (V) IEM Intrade Betfair Expert Stat.
α̂g 0.103
∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ 0.133
(6.922) (4.926) (5.530) (-3.418) (-23.634) (-3.505) (0.363)
β̂g 0.647
∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 1.130∗∗∗ 1.266∗∗∗ 0.849
(19.834) (8.413) (28.222) (200.593) (290.260) (22.573) (1.284)
p val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.896
F stat 68.977 12.618 16.328 12.015 584.645 13.325 0.111
σ̂2g 0.453 0.128 0.111 0.127 0.082 0.280 0.501
T 3467 360 1110 43295 41882 293 14
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2: Regressions for bias and precision for all relevant forecasts for obser-
vations within one week of an election.
Intrade and expert opinion exhibit FLB. The traditional favourite-longshot
bias is the observed phenomenon, found in numerous studies dispersed in time
and across the world, that ‘longshots’ (outcomes quoted at high odds) tend
to win less often than implied in the odds while ‘favourites’ (outcomes quoted
at low odds) tend to win relatively more often than implied in the odds (e.g.
Sung and Johnson (e.g. 2010); Snowberg and Wolfers (e.g. 2010). This may
help explain the difference in accuracy noted in Figure 13, where Betfair and
Intrade appear to dominate the other three forecast models. If favourites win
more often than their forecast suggests, as with Betfair and Intrade, then the
percentage of forecasts that turn out correct must be higher, and vice versa with
polls and IEM.
Thus our regression models from Table 1 lend support to the conclusions
drawn from Figure 14: over the longer horizon all forecast models appear to
exhibit quite substantial bias, with the exception of Intrade and opinion polls,
while opinion polls appear to provide the least precise forecasts.
As with accuracy, we can refine somewhat our analysis of bias and precision
by looking at forecasts made at various points before an election. Tables 2–4
show the same regressions as Table 1 but for forecasts made within the final
week of an election (Table 2), forecasts made between 2 and 10 weeks before
and election (Table 3), and forecasts made between 11 and 40 weeks before an
election (Table 2).
From Table 2 polls display much more bias in the final week than in the
overall regressions in Table 1, while Intrade continues to display little bias. IEM
markets still display reverse FLB while Betfair still displays a small FLB. The
performance of expert opinion seems little different in the final week compared
to overall (and to the other forecast models), while the statistical model, being
only estimated over real-time data from the final week before the election, is
unchanged from Table 1.
As we move to longer horizons in Tables 3 and 4, we observe that both
Intrade and Betfair display a more pronounced bias, IEM markets show no
clear pattern, polls less bias and expert opinion bias patterns are essentially un-
changed from the final week. Intriguingly the regressions coefficients for expert
opinion and Intrade are almost identical at the 2–10 week horizon, although
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Polls IEM (V) IEM Intrade Betfair Expert
α̂g -0.082
∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(-9.708) (17.194) (11.412) (-32.560) (-63.753) (-4.515)
β̂g 1.177
∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ 1.136∗∗∗ 1.422∗∗∗ 1.136∗∗∗
(64.086) (21.271) (74.193) (218.537) (282.062) (44.182)
p val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F stat 50.072 149.530 70.016 533.289 3602.357 14.740
σ̂2g 0.409 0.136 0.121 0.150 0.076 0.341
T 9626 3218 9597 82135 35054 2499
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3: Regressions for bias and precision for all four firms over observations
within 2 and 10 weeks of an election.
both are distinctly different from the other two prediction markets (Betfair and
IEM). This suggests a similar pattern in terms of bias, but Intrade displays a
much higher degree of precision.
The information presented here suggests that firstly in terms of correct fore-
casts, prediction markets and expert opinion dominate polls. Consideration
of bias and precision shows that all forecast models are shown to be biased in
different directions and magnitudes at different times (with the exception of
bias-corrected polls over longer horizons than the final week before an election),
while levels of precision also vary with prediction markets being the most precise
and polls and expert opinion the least.
Returning to the work of Gelman and King (1993), we note that certainly in
terms of accuracy expert opinion (and prediction markets) do dominate opinion
polls, which is a finding of theirs, and particularly at longer horizons. Further-
more, our finding that in the final week of campaigns even bias-corrected polls
perform notably worse without a similar fall off in expert (or prediction market)
forecasts is also consistent, as it suggests that the most learning on the part of
voters is taking place during that period.
Considering also Erikson and Wlezien (2008), like them we bias correct polls,
which they argue is essential in order to appropriately compare polls with pre-
diction markets. Nonetheless, despite bias correcting we find that opinion polls
in the final week before an election display marked bias and a lack of precision
relative to prediction markets, and overall perform worse in terms of accuracy.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated a number of information sources that might
be used to form a forecast of an election outcome. We consider the forecasts
of opinion polls, three commonly used prediction markets, a statistical model,
and expert opinion. We assess these forecast models in terms of accuracy,
bias and precision. We make use of very large datasets recording the forecast
performance of these different models over a large number of elections in the US.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Polls IEM (V) IEM Intrade Betfair Expert
α̂g 0.027
∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(2.643) (23.438) (24.190) (-46.585) (-44.505) (-17.66)
β̂g 0.969
∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 1.289∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗
(42.053) (26.797) (73.972) (281.890) (296.885) (127.47)
p val 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F stat 5.308 274.713 292.717 2007.052 2509.161 26.932
σ̂2g 0.442 0.140 0.141 0.079 0.113 0.243
T 7584 6485 17317 67949 81133 5359
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4: Regressions for bias and precision for all four firms over observations
within 11 and 40 weeks of an election.
Our analysis suggests that prediction markets tend to provide more accurate
forecasts, and although corrected poll forecasts appear less biased they are less
precise. In particular commercial prediction markets display distinct favourite
longshot bias, suggesting that they are more able to identify favourites that
subsequently win the election, which helps explain why these models forecast
more accurately. Expert opinion similarly displays bias and is not particularly
precise.
Overall our results provide more evidence on the relative performance of
opinion polls and prediction markets; support is given to Gelman and King
(1993) as opinion poll performance is dominated, particularly in the final week
before an election, and while bias corrected poll do perform competitively at a
general level, we nonetheless fail to find convincingly in favour of opinion polls
in this assessment, which contrasts with the findings of Erikson and Wlezien
(2009).
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A Data Information Tables
The Tables on the following pages contain information on the make-up of each
of our datasets introduced in Section 3 and analysed in Section 5.
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Election Start Finish Freq. Percent
Congress 2000 28jan1999 08nov2000 2,592 5.69
Congress 2002 19jul2002 07nov2002 448 0.98
Congress 2004 17jun2004 05nov2004 568 1.25
Congress 2006 01jun2006 12nov2006 664 1.46
Congress 2008 22aug2008 07nov2008 312 0.68
Congress 2010 24nov2009 04nov2010 1,344 2.95
Senate Elections 2004 17jun2004 05nov2004 426 0.93
Senate Elections 2006 01jun2006 10nov2006 492 1.08
Senate Elections 2008 22aug2008 07nov2008 234 0.51
Senate Elections 2010 24nov2009 04nov2010 1,003 2.20
Florida Senate Election 2010 (vote share) 04jun2010 30nov2010 720 1.58
Florida Senate Election (winners takes all) 04jun2010 30nov2010 720 1.58
Minnesota Senate Election 2008 (vote share) 20aug2008 08nov2008 243 0.53
Minnesota Senate Election 2008 (winners takes all) 20aug2008 08nov2008 243 0.53
New York Senate Election 2000 14jun1999 08nov2000 2,725 5.98
House Elections 04 17jun2004 05nov2004 426 0.93
House Elections 06 01jun2006 10nov2006 492 1.08
House Elections 08 22aug2008 07nov2008 234 0.51
House Elections 10 24nov2009 04nov2010 1,004 2.20
Presidential Election 2000 (vote share) 03jan2000 05nov2000 920 2.02
Presidential Election 2000 (winners takes all) 24apr2000 10nov2000 597 1.31
Presidential Election 2008 (vote share) 01jun2006 07nov2008 1,830 4.01
Presidential Election 2008 (winners takes all) 01jun2006 07nov2008 1,830 4.01
Presidential Election 2004 (vote share) 20feb2003 31jul2004 7,026 15.41
Presidential Election 2004 (winners takes all) 26may2004 05nov2004 426 0.93
Democratic Convention 2000 14jun1999 17aug2000 3,219 7.06
Democratic Convention 2004 20feb2003 30jul2004 3,419 7.50
Democratic Convention 2008 24feb2007 28aug2008 2,300 5.04
Republican Convention 2000 14jun1999 03aug2000 2,339 5.13
Republican Convention 2008 24feb2007 10sep2008 3,141 6.89
Reform Convention 2000 03jan2000 12aug2000 1,105 2.42
Iowa Republican Caucus 12 29aug2011 05jan2012 889 1.95
New York City Mayoral Election 2001 03oct2001 09nov2001 108 0.24
Philadelphia Mayoral Election 2007 (vote share) 02apr2007 02jul2007 534 1.17
Philadelphia Mayoral Election 2007 (winners takes all) 02apr2007 02jul2007 529 1.16
Mexican Presidential Election 2000 (vote share) 01may2000 02jul2000 244 0.54
Mexican Presidential Election 2000 (winner takes all) 01may2000 02jul2000 244 0.54
Total 45,590
Table 6: Summary of data publicly available from Iowa Electronic Markets on
polling for US elections.
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Type Market Observations Type Market Observations
Presidential
Election
2004 44,462
Republican
Candidacy
Republican Candidate 19,505
2008 11,831 California Primary 566
Democratic
Candidacy
Democratic Candidate 39,012 Florida Primary 1,774
Alabama Primary 123 Iowa Caucus 501
Alaska Caucus 2 Michigan Primary 527
Arizona Primary 132 Nevada Caucus 357
Arkansas Primary 4 New Hampshire Primary 545
California Primary 1,564 New Jersey Primary 28
Colorado Caucus 7 South Carolina Primary 633
Connecticut Primary 78 New York Primary 26
Delaware Primary 13 Total 24,462
Georgia Primary 63
Next
President
Additional Runners 885
Idaho Caucus 4 Joe Biden 1,750
Illinois Primary 60 Michael Bloomberg 1,497
Indiana Primary 1,860 Mike Huckabee 965
Iowa Caucus 941 Mitt Romney 1,224
Kansas Caucus 6 Ron Paul 1,009
Kentucky Primary 88 Rudy Giuliani 977
Massachusetts Primary 227 Sarah Palin 901
Minnesota Caucus 13 Al Gore 3,151
Missouri Primary 184 Barack Obama 33,105
Nevada Caucus 516 Hillary Clinton 10,405
New Hampshire Primary 1,710 John Edwards 454
New Jersey Primary 250 John McCain 27,484
New Mexico Caucus 19 Total 83,807
New York Primary 249
Elections
2008
Arkansas 120
North Carolina Primary 551 Indiana 3,103
North Dakota Caucus 2 New Mexico 154
Ohio Primary 1,041 North Dakota 317
Oklahoma Primary 19 Nevada 211
Oregon Primary 148 Colorado 224
Pennsylvania Primary 1,265 Florida 1,593
Tennessee Primary 55 Georgia 622
Texas Primary 2,305 Kentucky 170
Utah Primary 17 Missouri 1,337
Washington Caucus 69 Montana 376
West Virginia Primary 110 Nebraska 41
Wisconsin Primary 460 Ohio 840
Total 53,167 North Carolina 1,117
Pennsylania 310
Total 10,535
Grand Total 228,264
Table 7: Data from Betfair on US Elections
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Market Obs. Market Obs. Market Obs.
Presidential Election - Main Presidential Election - Other House of Representatives
Winner (Indiv.) 334,286 Bob Barr - Elec. Coll. Votes 14 2008 House Control 368
Winner (Party) 18,007 Bob Barr - Popular Vote 444 Dem. Seats in House 548
Rep. Elec. College Votes 1,225 Dropouts, April 172 Dist. 12 Penn 2
Electoral College Tie 90 Dropouts, Dec. 210 Dist. 6 Minn 2
Alabama 38 Dropouts, Feb 519 Total 920
Alaska 209 Dropouts, Jan 349 Senate
Arizona 784 Dropouts, Jun 72 2008 Senate Control 501
Arkansas 248 Dropouts, Jul 1,291 Dem. Seats in Senate 1,444
California 293 Dropouts, May 186 Alabama 4,919
Colorado 926 Dropouts, Mar 568 Alaska 393
Connecticut 109 LA Times Obama PLO video 3 Colorado 29
Delaware 29 Ralph Nader - Popular Vote 117 Georgia 599
Florida 2,535 Joe Biden to be withdrawn 548 Idaho 22
New Jersey 405 Sarah Palin to be withdrawn 2,599 Kansas 6
Nevada 877 Michael Bloomberg Independent 1,073 Kentucky 75
Nebraska 63 Ron Paul Independent 249 Louisiana 64
Montana 1,270 Who benefit most from 1st debate 330 Maine 22
Missouri 2,803 Who benefit most from VP debate 606 Massachusetts 2
Mississippi 111 Who will run for President? 941 Minnesota 2,092
Michigan 487 Date of 1st Debate 215 Nebraska 29
Minnesota 576 Election Postponed? 48 New Hampshire 179
Maryland 52 Obama Touch Mkt 9 New Jersey 27
Georgia 1,605 McCain Touch Mkt 39 New Mexico 64
Hawaii 17 X: Obama Options. F 123 Mississippi (Class I) 81
Idaho 16 X: Obama Options. M 15 Mississippi (Class II) 5
Illinois 57 X: Obama Options. T 1 North Carolina 170
Indiana 3,956 X: Obama Options. W 83 Oklahoma 8
Iowa 558 X: Obama Options. W 147 Oregon 184
Kansas 142 X: Obama Options. W 54 South Carolina 2
Kentucky 93 X: Obama Options. W 75 South Dakota 14
Louisiana 194 X: Obama Options. W 98 Texas 65
Maine 152 X: Obama Options. W 82 Virginia 69
Massachusetts 26 X: McCain Options. Fr 132 West Virginia 1
North Carolina 3,212 X: McCain Options. Mo 1 Wyoming (Class I) 3
North Dakota 1,023 X: McCain Options. We 21 Total 11989
Ohio 1,846 X: McCain Options. We 17 Governor Elections
Oklahoma 37 X: McCain Options. We 7 Delaware 2
Oregon 247 X: McCain Options. We 19 Kentucky 1
Pennsylvania 1,404 X: McCain Options. We 12 Louisiana 1
New Hampshire 796 X: McCain Options. We 34 Missouri 8
New Mexico 586 Total 11523 North Carolina 13
New York 118 Other Utah 2
Rhode Island 30 Immigration Reform Act 20 24 Vermont 1
South Dakota 120 London Mayoral Election 2008 94 Washington 12
South Carolina 187 Massachusetts Question 1 8 Total 40
Tennessee 141 Media Endorsements 20 Party Convention
Texas 125 New York City Mayoral Term Limits 18 Brokered Conventions 579
Utah 24 Next Prime Minister of New Zealand 6 Clinton Lifeline 524
Vermont 61 Next UK Chancellor 15 Hillary Clinton on Dem. ticket 64
Virginia 2,237 Pres. Job Appr. Rating. Dec 3 119 MI/FL hold new Primary? 426
Washington 128 Pres. Job Appr. Rating. Jun 3 38 Most Superdelegates? 423
West Virginia 863 Pres. Job Appr. Rating. Mar 3 29 Total 2016
Wisconsin 395 Pres. Job Appr. Rating. Sep 3 72
Wyoming 22 Fairness Doctrine 6
Total 385,841 Total 449
Total 411,858
Table 8: Summary of data from Intrade for 2008 elections.
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